tent of a perceptual state is, I believe, particularly appropriate to explaining the structure of computational theories. Let us say that the content of a perceptual state, its Husserlian noema, is expressible by means of a definite description. Then the object of perception is the unique object that satisfies the definite description. If there is no such object, the perception is nonveridical-it is a misperception.4
The content of a perceptual state may be regarded as having two components. First, it presents an object as possessing a certain characteristic-it may present an object as red, for example, or as moving in a certain direction, or as five feet away. Second, there is something about the state which accounts for the fact that the state has a unique object-not just any red thing is the object of a redpresenting state, but some unique red thing. An adequate theory of perceptual aboutness must account for both these features of perception, its mode of presentation and its individual-directedness.
In my opinion, any adequate theory of the individual-directedness of perception will be causal. A promising theory along these lines has recently been offered by David Woodruff Smith, elaborating on an idea of John Searle's.5 According to this theory, the definite description that expresses the content of a perceptual state has a self-referential causal-indexical component. Searle's idea is that the content of a perceptual state is always expressible in this form: the individual that has the property F and is causing THIS state. The object of a perceptual state, then, will be whatever satisfies this description.
The only variable element in content so expressed is the property F by which the individual is characterized. Every perceptual state is directed toward some individual causing the state itself, but some states are directed toward the red object causing it, some toward the moving object causing it, and so on. This variable element is the mode of presentation. Computational theories are efforts to explain how perceptual states present external objects. The question I shall seek to address in what follows is this: What feature of a perceptual state makes it a presentation of a particular property, say redness? As a warning against a possible confusion, I should remark that, even though content as a whole has a causal-indexical element, it does not follow that an account of the mode of presentation should be causal as well.
II. INTERNALIST CRITERIA OF CONTENT
Some epistemologists have claimed that the quale, or subjective character of a state, constitutes its mode of presentation-thus a state presents an object as red in virtue of its being associated with a red quale or sense datum. Others give some internal material state the same role as qualia. Just as pain has been identified with a stimulation of the C-fibers, a red-presentation might be identified with some neurological concomitant of seeing red. Such theories are internalist because they ascribe content to states solely on the strength of their intrinsic character and refer to nothing outside the perceiver, especially not to the external things represented by perception.
An internalist theory is unsatisfactory for several reasons. Most importantly for our present purposes, it cannot adequately account for the distality of perceptual content found in computational theories. As an example of what I mean, let us consider in some detail Edwin H. Land's theory of color vision,6 which is regarded by many as an early paradigm of the computational approach to perception.
The cone cells of the retina are sensitive to the color of light. Consequently, many psychologists and many philosophers have assumed (in a tradition going back to Newton's Optics) that the color we see is the color of the light incident on our retinas. But this is false. Our perceptions of color are, in fact, much more closely correlated with the true color of surfaces, even when they reflect light that might be expected to be quite misleading. This was recognized to be the case as long ago as Helmholtz, but most conclusively established in a series of experiments, conducted by Land and J. J. McCann, in which human observers were shown to be able to detect that two surfaces were different in color, and what their true colors were, even though the illumination was so rigged that the surfaces were sending light of exactly the same color to the eye and so should have been indistinguishable.
But how can vision detect true color if it is sensitive only to light color? The color of light reflected from a surface is a function of two independent variables-the color of the surface itself, and the color of the illumination incident upon it.7 Thus, the color of light incident 7 Let us divide visible light into three wavelength ranges: long, medium, and short. Then the color of a surface can be defined as the ordered triple of the upon the retina is compatible with an infinite number of covarying combinations of surface color and illumination color. What is needed, then, from an adequate theory of color vision, is an account of how the visual system is able to discriminate surface colors, given only light color; in other words, how it separates out the contributions to afferent light color due to each external factor.
In the world in which we live, there are many abrupt changes in surface color, but very few abrupt changes of illumination. According to Land, color vision uses a process that is effective because of this fact. It distinguishes types of brightness gradient in the image incident upon the retina. Sudden changes of brightness are identified as being due to changes in surface color, and more gradual changes are identified as being due to changes in illumination. In this way, our vision assigns a surface-color gradient to each point in a scene. Absolute colors are then assigned to points by a process of calibration, the details of which need not concern us here.
It is very important to be clear on what Land uses to explain what. First, Land uses psychological experiments to identify a physical variable, surface color, as that which is presented by color vision. The problem he then tackles is that information concerning this detected property is unavailable at the retina. So Land appeals to an indicator of the detected property which he claims is present in the retinal image, and uses it to explain how the visual system has access to the presence of the external property.
Obviously this procedure raises a number of interesting questions. What is important for our immediate purposes is that Land typeidentifies perceptual states by the external property they present, not by their quale nor by any other internal characteristic. The direction of explanation in Land's theory is from external properties and their indicators to the content of states. Internalist theories reverse this direction of explanation. For them, the similarities relevant to content attribution are internal, not external, and any representational relationship borne by states to external reality must be accounted for by internally specified manipulations of content. As an extreme of this attitude, consider qualia theories. They type-identify states by their qualia, and identify external objects as having the same property because they tend to produce qualitatively similar states in us.8 reflectances of the surface for light in these three wavebands. The color of a beam of light is the average of wavelengths in the beam weighted by the energy present in each wavelength.
8There are two versions of a definition of color by means of qualia. The first sort makes color a construction out of qualia. The second sort uses qualia to identify a Now, it is possible to argue that Land's type-identification will have to be nearly coextensive with a type-identification by internal criteria. For, as we have seen, the experimental verification of Land's hypothesized mode of presentation lay in the ability of observers to identify the true colors of surfaces (even when they sent misleading signals to the eye). One would think that observers identify a surface as having a color as a result of some internally available feature of the perception, perhaps a quale. So there must be some intrinsic difference between perceptions of different things. To put this point in general terms, a perceiver's epistemic access to the content of his or her perceptual states must be through internal characteristics. This access has to be reliable, if not infallible; so there will always be an extensionally correct (or nearly correct) internalist definition of content.9 Nevertheless, such definitions will misrepresent computational theories, because they will miss what such theories take to be the essence of content. former is or is not caused by a rigid body will be otiose-what I do will be the same in either case.
III. CAUSAL THEORIES OF THE MODE OF PRESENTATION
An inside-out theory of perceptual content recognizes that there must be internal features of a state which provide the perceiver with access to its content. It thus looks at intrinsic features of a perceptual state and asks: How does a state with these intrinsic features present its object? In this way, it assigns distal content to internally identifiable types of states. Now, suppose that we have two states with the same intrinsic character, one caused by a particular external object or feature, and the other not. An inside-out theory will assign the same content to both states, and so this assignment must not imply that the external object or feature is present. There are two options available for achieving an assignment of this sort.
First, one may retain the assumption that content is cause, and so retreat to some more proximal common cause of the two states. For example, when it was believed that two different surface colors could result in the same sort of state, under different conditions of illumination, philosophers claimed that it is not surface color that we see, but rather the color of the light incident upon the eye. Similarly, it has been held that what we see is projected shape, size, and motion, not actual shape, size, and motion-the move is familiar. It is this move which we wish to avoid in order to maintain the characteristic distality of content attribution in computational theories.
The other alternative is to drop the causal assumption. This approach need not be as i-adically at odds with the general causal intuition as it looks, for one might say that a state with content C is usually or normally caused by an object that is C. My argument here seeks to show that no such move will work. Causal theories of the mode of presentation have to be abandoned altogether.
Let us look at the matter in more detail. Before we find out what normal misperception is, let us briefly look at two sorts of misperception which are adequately accounted for by the version of IOC which appeals to the normal causes of a sort of perceptual state. The first is caused by malfunction: if a system is not working normally, because of genetic damage or injury, then misperceptions may result. Second, maladaptation: if a system is exposed to environmental circumstances to which it is not adapted, circumstances manufactured by a laboratory worker for example, then it may be "fooled." Is misperception always due to malfunction or maladaptation, as Fodor conjectured in "Semantics, Wisconsin Style"? If so, then, on a plausible understanding of the 'normally' in IOC, we should have an adequate causal account of the mode of presentation.
But there is another source of misperception. Perceptual states play a mediating role between external circumstances and appropriate behavior. But the features of the external world which affect a system may not be those which are "task-relevant." This is immediately apparent in the case, already described, of color vision. Our retinas are sensitive to the color of light. But light color tells us little that is useful about the things we have to deal with; so we are in need of a system that is able to process afferent "sensory information," yielding a characterization of the external world in terms of surface color. Now, in carrying out this "processing," the visual system is hampered by the fact that the afferent sensory information it works with underdetermines conclusions about surface color. That is, the afferent information is compatible (given the laws of how light is reflected by surfaces) with several different and incompatible "conclusions" about surface color. So color vision uses an indicator of surface color which is present in the retinal image to arrive at the representation the organism needs. However-and this is the important point-the indicator is not perfect. It is possible to create a surface on which the color changes gradually, in just the way that illumination normally changes. In uniform illumination, such a surface would be perceived as uniformly colored and variably illuminated.'2 Here we have a 12 Imagine a white table-cloth illuminated from one end by a white lamp and from the other by a red lamp. The illumination will vary gradually across its expanse, situation in which the visual system represents a surface-color gradient, nonveridically, as an illumination gradient; in other words, we have a misperception.
The kind of misperception I want to draw attention to arises from the fact that our ability perceptually to discriminate the colors of surfaces in widely varying conditions of illumination is made possible by the use of indicators that are imperfect, but nevertheless the best available. If the visual system did not use such indicators, the only kind of color we perceived would be the color of light incident upon the retina, which is useless. The price of using the imperfect correlation is occasional misperception, a small price to pay for a useful representation of the world.
It is obvious that the misperceptions arising from the use of such imperfect indicators will not be traceable to malfunction: the error lies in the indicator itself, not in how it is used. Nor can the misperception be claimed to result from the visual system's being maladapted to the situations it encounters; for the indicator is not perfectly reliable even in the range of situations to which the visual system is adapted. (In many such cases, no indicator could be, since the afferent information underdetermines the detected property.) The point that has to be understood is that, even with reference to the range of situations to which the system is well adapted, it is better to use an imperfect indicator than to have no access to task-relevant properties. To use veridicality as a filter on this range of situations is to show a touching, but quite unbiological, devotion to truth.
It is misperceptions of this sort which I shall entitle normal. They result from the use of indicators that are imperfect but the best available, where this use confers an over-all advantage upon the organism, despite the occasional occurrence of error. Such misperceptions cannot easily be accommodated by a causal theory, because these are cases where, for example, a perception of red is caused by a blue surface even in normal circumstances.'3 going from nearly white at one end to red at the other. If Land is right, this cloth should not look white at one end, red at the other. It should look uniformly white, and red-lit at one end, and white-lit at the other. Now, take a color photograph of the cloth and print the photograph on the cloth. The cloth will now really be red at one end, shading gradually to white at the other. Now, replace the red lamp by a white lamp of the same intensity. The cloth will look uniformly white, and as before, variably illuminated. 
IV. BIOLOGICAL FUNCTIONS: WRIGHT'S ACCOUNT
The first step toward outlining my theory is to introduce the notion of a biological adaptation. Functional explanation in biology seeks to explain why an organism has a particular characteristic (or disposition) by appeal to other characteristics it has as a consequence. There is a good example in the "Science and the Citizen" section of the January 1982 issue of Scientific American. There, under the heading "Thin Red Line," we find a report of speculation concerning the function of the adherence of red cells to immune complexes in mammals. According to this report, the adherence phenomenon had been well known, but thought to have no "functional significance." But it had recently been discovered to be modulated by time and circumstance; it is depressed in human cancer patients, and enhanced in humans with autoimmune diseases. These observations led to two hypotheses, due to different teams of investigators: one team claims that "red cells must be the main agents for clearing immune complexes from the circulation," and the other that they "serve as intermediaries that promote the interaction of a T-cell and its specific antigen, thereby enhancing T-cell activity." The question asked here is of the form: Why does the immune system have complexes that do F? And the answer takes the form: Because as a result of having such entities, the system is able to do G.
Larry Wright provides us with a good foundation for understanding why explanation by reference to functions is applicable to biological entities.'4 His analysis of the meaning of 'Z is the function of X' runs as follows: mins tells us that functional explanation regards a function as a complex disposition that is explained by showing how simpler dispositions mesh together to result in the complex disposition. Cummins's theory gives an admirable account of the "forward" explanatory direction from X to its function, but not of the "backward" direction from the function to the characteristics by which it is achieved. Consequently, Cummins counterintuitively denies that there is any explanation in the backward direction. But it is precisely this backward explanatory direction which is accounted for by the historical element in Wright's analysis.
The historical element in Wright's account is important also because, if Cummins is right about functions, then there will be no way to choose between rival function ascriptions. We saw earlier that there were two rival hypotheses concerning the "functional significance" of red blood cells' adhering to immune complexes-that it contributes to the removal of immunological detritus, and that it enhances T-cell activity. Now suppose, as is possible, that in fact the adhesion phenomenon does both these things. Then Cummins is unable to choose between the rival hypotheses, because both show how the phenomenon contributes to some disposition of the immune system. Yet, this is a common phenomenon: many features of an organ are such as to have multiple effects, only some of which are functionally significant. What is to prevent us from giving a Cummins-style functional analysis of all or any of these effects?
This consequence of Cummins's view is particularly counterintuitive when it involves effects that actually reduce fitness. The narwhal has a large tusk which actually reduces its mobility. Presumably the tusk is there in order to increase the conspicuousness of a narwhal in mating situations. Obviously, then, the function of the tusk is to increase the sexual attractiveness of the animal; certainly its function cannot be to reduce mobility. Yet, a Cummins-style functional analysis can be given of how the tusk reduces the narwhal's mobility. Wright's analysis is superior to Cummins's because it is able to discriminate between effects on the basis of which one was historically responsible for the phenomenon that is to be functionally explained.
V. BIOLOGICAL ADAPTATIONS
Although I view Wright's analysis as basically correct, it needs to be extended. It is not only the result of an activity that plays a historical role in selection, but also the surrounding circumstances that make the selected activity a good way, or the only way, to achieve the result.
Consequently, functional explanations found in biology make essential use of facts other than those mentioned in Wright's account.
A good example is to be found in a recent account of ribosome synthesis in the bacterium E. coli. 6 According to this account, the bacterium needs to detect and control the rates at which it synthesizes ribosomes, and the proteins out of which ribosomes are built up. The author reasons as follows: any bacterium acts so as to maximize cell growth and cell division. Now, in order to maximize cell growth and division, the cell has to make enzymes. But enzymes can be manufactured only by ribosomes, so the bacterium must manufacture more ribosomes. On the other hand, the ribosome and its components are energetically expensive to manufacture, and making a surplus is wasteful. Therefore, the bacterium must detect and control the rate of ribosome synthesis and ribosomal protein synthesis, making sure that it is adequate but not excessive.
This exposition endows the activities of the organism not only with functions, but with functional structure. It makes implicit use of functional statements such as:
The function of enzyme synthesis is to facilitate increased metabolism and reproduction. The function of ribosome synthesis is to facilitate enzyme synthesis.
But it also alludes to certain facts that make some activity necessary for the optimal performance of some function. These facts may concern the internal organization of E. coli or its parts:
Ribosomes are sites for enzyme synthesis.
Or they may concern E. coli's environment (in a broad sense of that term):
Ribosomes are energetically expensive to manufacture.
The role these facts play in the explanation is to subordinate one function to another. The function of ribosome synthesis is subordinated to the function of enzyme synthesis, because the latter is necessary for the former given that ribosomes are the sites at which enzymes are manufactured. The function of controlling the rate of ribosome synthesis is subordinated to the proper performance of ribosome synthesis, because ribosome synthesis is expensive. By 'proper', I mean "such as not to detract from the performance of other functions." Clearly, some measure is required by which to balance off one performance against another: this measure is fitness. In short, facts are used to subordinate one function to another as means to end.
How are we to account for the explanatory value of these facts? The most natural way is to extend Wright's analysis of functions so as to allow that certain facts might have been historically influential in shaping the present constitution of an individual. Thus, consider two activities F and G of an organism such that (1) G has the consequence F in circumstances C. (2) G is there because it does F in circumstances C.
Under these conditions, we shall say that G has function F in circumstances C; or, conversely, that G is the realization of F in C. The distinction between activities (G), the functions they serve (F), and the circumstances in which G is subordinate to F, will turn out to be crucial to our account of perceptual presentation.
VI. THE ORIGINS OF PERCEPTION
The above account of functions is adequate for understanding claims about standing features of organisms, e.g., "The function of ribosome synthesis is to facilitate increased metabolism and reproduction." But there is an application of functional explanation which we have yet to touch upon. To see why, consider that biological entities such as fingernails and eyebrows have functions. But fingernails do not, in order to perform their functions, modify their activities to suit changing circumstances-they just sit there.
By contrast, E. coli's control of its ribosome synthesis is a much more complex activity: it involves responding differently to different situations. When ribosomes are being manufactured faster than they can be used, there will be idle ribosomes present. These attach to a gene (an operon), which then shuts down further ribosome synthesis. When all available ribosomes are involved in enzyme manufacturing activity, the operon becomes unattached again, and ribosome synthesis starts up again. A similar mechanism controls the manufacture of the ribosomal components. Thus, the bacterium's behavior is plastic.
It is obvious that the plastic behavior of E. coli is subordinate to its functions in exactly the same way as some of its functions are subordinate to others. The control system is a permanent feature of the bacterium, and its presence is explained by the need to make neither too many nor too few ribosomes. Given this explanation of the existence of the control system, it seems possible to extend the chain of means and ends down into the plastic activities involved in ribosome synthesis. Let us distinguish between two levels of description. A system can be described either as executing a constant function or as behaving in a variable manner. These two levels are linked by the fact that, in different sets of circumstances, the system has to perform different activities in order to be executing the constant function. Thus, we have the familiar pattern of variable activity being subordinated to a function, and being variable simply because the facts that mediate the subordination are themselves variable.'7 Now, it is obvious that Wright's historical stratagem will be of no use in explaining this pattern of subordination, since functionally subordinate activities and subordinating circumstances covary concurrently. What is required here is not historical causation, but direct causation. There are two patterns of direct causation which could be used. The system could be taken to be functionally so organized that changing circumstances directly influence functionally directed behavior. Or it could be taken to be functionally so organized as to have internal states which register changing circumstances and which then initiate the activity functionally appropriate to the circumstances thus registered. Broadly speaking, the latter will be used when there is a possibility that behavior appropriate to circumstance C will be initiated even when C does not obtain-the resulting inappropriate behavior may then be explained by the system's falsely registering C. I shall suppose that such internal states are the evolutionary precursors of perceptual states, and ask what would be a suitable schema for attributing content to them. I do not mean to imply that such content attribution is legitimate. My interest in pursuing a content-attribution schema for such states lies solely in the extension of the schema to perception.'8
We have seen that our bacterium E. coli does indeed have an internal state that mediates functionally appropriate activity in changing circumstances. When there are idle ribosomes they attach to an operon. When in this state, the operon "switches off" ribosome synthesis. When the ribosome is needed, it gets detached from 1' Some philosophers have treated variable activity, under the rubric of "goal-directed activity," quite separately from functions-the tendency is to give an account of these in terms of concurrent causation only. See Matthen and Levy (op. cit., note 13), section ii, for a criticism of such theories. It is a virtue of the current account that it eludes these criticisms, which are also dependent on the notion of normal error. 18 In his "Intention and Action among the Macromolecules," in N. Rescher, ed., Current Issues in Teleology (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986), pp. 65-76, Alexander Rosenberg shows that biochemists have a tendency to describe such states in intentional terms, quoting from a biochemistry textbook which, in the space of a single paragraph, describes tRNA as recognizing, discriminating, undertaking tasks, making errors, editing, correcting, avoiding, and proofreading (65/6). Rosenberg argues that the analogy between goal-directed behavior "among the macromolecules" and perception, intention, and action in humans is enough to justify or even compel the use of intentionality. I do not agree with this. the operon. In this new state, the operon switches on ribosome synthesis. Let us entitle these states of the operon quasi-perceptual states. The question is: What is their content? Intuitively, the right answer is given by the fact that the functional role of the states is to initiate the activity appropriate to the circumstances. The control system has to "sense" when ribosome synthesis is going too fast or too slow, and these are the states which do it. So the ribosome-attached state of the operon is a sensing of excess ribosomes, and the ribosome-free state a sensing of the need for more ribosomes. That is the only answer that links the subordinate behavior to its function in the right way. This is just where the causal theory has found a foothold; for these states are caused, respectively, by excess (i.e., idle) ribosomes and by there being no excess ribosomes. But we have seen that there is reason to reject the causal account, as applied to real perceptual states, because it is incapable of accommodating normal error. Another difficulty for the causal theory is that causes can be redescribed. The states in question can be said to be caused not just by an excess or deficiency of ribosomes, but by the presence or absence of idle ribosomes or of molecules with a certain chemical composition, and so on. The causal route does not, in other words, give us a schema that is potentially able to handle the intensionality of perceptual content.
There is another way of getting to what we have identified as the "right answer." Why not use the functional hierarchy to identify the mode of presentation? Might it not be because the function of the state is to trigger the action appropriate to an excess of ribosomes, that we want to say that its content is precisely the presence of such an excess? This way of identifying content is going to yield results quite close to the causal theory, simply because one should expect that, if a state has the function of triggering the appropriate response to the presence of Xs, then it will be brought into being by Xs-otherwise, there would be no reliable matching of response and situation, and natural selection would have to "search for" some other way of achieving the appropriate response. In fact, the two theories will diverge precisely in those cases where there is misperception. For, if a state that has the function of bringing about the appropriate response to the presence of xs does come about in the absence of xs, the functional theory would lead us to say that the organism falsely sensed the presence of xs. But this is precisely what we ought to be led to say, is it not? After all, we have given these internal states a role in the theory precisely in order to explain the system's responding to the presence of xs, even when xs are absent. These reflections suggest the following schema for ascribing a "mode of presentation" to the quasi-perceptual states we are con- The most obvious way to retain the intuitions behind the functional schema is to get rid of the reference to the proper behavioral output of perception. Suppose we think of perception not as leading directly to action, but as leading to epistemic and practical assessment, which, in turn, leads to action. Can we not then define the output of perception in terms of its input to these faculties? The following is an attempt to do this: It may very well be right to say, as Goodman does, that perceptual content cannot be got at by peeling off layers ofjudgmental content. But I think that it is possible, nevertheless, to get at what perception contributes to judgment, simply because it is possible to create situations in which the output of perception gets isolated by the fact that judgment is not allowed sufficient information with which to comment on it. Techniques for achieving this result experimentally are in evidence in the pioneering work by Bela Julesz and Land.20
Julesz was dealing with depth perception by means of measurements of binocular disparity, i.e., the displacement of an image of something on one retina with respect to the other. The big problem that has to be solved before this sort of depth perception can fully be elucidated is this: How do we manage to identify two images as of the same object-how do we match images in order to measure their binocular disparity? Some psychologists of perception have tried to solve this problem at a very high level; they proposed that the world is first segregated into big external objects (such as geometrical figures on a ground or even objects such as pieces of furniture or human beings) by means of some innate (so says the Gestalt theory) or learned ("New Look" theories) process of identification, and that the images of these objects are then matched. This is the type of proposal which leads to Goodman's sort of skepticism about the separability of perception and other mental processes, for it makes " Languages of Art, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1975) Julesz disproved the contention that the measurement of binocular disparity is a process that operates at a "high level" by recreating depth perception on "random-dot stereograms." These stereograms consist of two images: one is a computer-generated random pattern of dots, and the other is a repetition of the same with a square region shifted over by a few minutes of arc. When these images are presented, one to one eye and the other to the other, it appears that the square region is closer to the observer than the rest. This shows that the binocular disparity of the square region was detectable. But, because the pattern consists only of randomly placed dots, the measurement could not have needed prior segregation of objects within the image.
Land's experiments concerned the perception of the brightness of an object. (When the brightness perception from all color channels is combined, this sort of perception amounts to color perception.) We have seen that the perceived brightness of an object exhibits a kind of constancy not displayed by the light it reflects under varied circumstances-for example, a uniformly colored wall will look uniformly colored, even when it is half in shadow. Now, this is a natural place for a high-level theory. How are we to explain the fact that different light information culminates in the same appearance? Why not say that our belief that the wall is uniformly colored informs our perception of it as uniformly colored? Land disproved this supposition by showing that humans are able to detect color constancy even in random patchworks of color-"Mondrians" as he called them, because of their resemblance to the abstract works of that artist. The Mondrians are presented to observers who have never seen them before; and these observers are able to discriminate different colors that are so illuminated as to send the same signal to the eye, and identify patches of the same color even when they are so illuminated as to send different signals to the eye. The constancy phenomena are thus displayed in the complete absence of any beliefs about the actual brightnesses present. Moreover, the Mondrians lack objects with which colors or brightnesses are inductively associated-apples, leaves, etc. So another source of interference by beliefs is eliminated.
I conclude from these results that it is at least sometimes possible to isolate what is detected by perception independently ofjudgment, decision, and the like. Whether or not it is true that perception can be influenced by judgment, this suggests that what perception detects exists independently ofjudgment. We shall now pursue schema P, the thesis that a perceptual state presents that which it is its function to detect.2'
VIII. REALISM AND THE FUNCTIONAL SCHEMA
It is a consequence of schema P (the functional schema, as I shall call it) that the properties presented by perception exist independently of perception. Understood in the light of the functional schema, Land's theory is a hypothesis about the functional organization of color vision. The function of color vision is to detect surface color. The (supposed) activity of the visual system in detecting brightness "edges" in the image incident upon the retina and in processing this information in the way described earlier is subordinate to the function of detecting color. The fact that mediates this subordination is, simply, the correlation between brightness edges and color discontinuities. It was, in other words, the historical operation of the correlation, together with the advantage of possessing a color detector, which was responsible for the evolutionary persistence of this edge processing. The claim that content can be attributed to perceptual states as a result of such hypotheses about functional organization has two immediate consequences. First, it provides ajustification for expressing the content of color vision in distal terms. Suppose that somebody were to say that Land's theory shows not that we see color, but that what we have so far mistakenly supposed to be color vision is, in fact, a system for detecting different sorts of brightness gradients in the (proximal) image incident upon the retina. This hypothesis about content is perfectly compatible with everything that Land says about the mechanism of color vision as it now exists. Only when we take the evolutionary development of color vision into account do the two ways of describing Land's theory turn out not to be factually equivalent. The functional schema gives crucial importance to the (supposed) fact that the ability to distinguish different sorts of brightness gradient in an image does not by itself confer an evolutionary advantage upon us. Rather, this discriminatory ability persists only because, as it happens, it happens to correlate closely with the ability to discriminate surface color.
A The second sort of example is more troubling, at first sight. Perceived color is not all due to reflectance. Some surfaces may be blue because of reflectance, but the sky is blue because of dispersion. There is no real property common to such diverse causes of color perception. I shall make two comments about this. In order to make the point that Hardin and Campbell want to make, one must show that misperception is not involved. Why should we not say that the sky is misperceived as blue? Maybe the evolutionary advantages of color vision pertain only to the discriminatory resources it affords with respect to surfaces. Perhaps perceiving the sky as blue is just an artifact of this mechanism and it neither increases nor decreases the fitness we get as a result. That would be the sort of case in which we should want to say that the sky is (normally) misperceived as blue. Thus, the fact that it is perceived as blue in normal circumstances does not imply that it is blue.
There is, however, a more general point in Campbell and Hardin's arguments which needs to be considered. We perceive not only reflecting surfaces as colored, but also translucent, irridescent, and luminous surfaces. The reflectances of these other surfaces is quite irrelevant to their perceived colors. Surely it makes no sense to say that these are all misperceived. But this still does not prove the conclusion. What it proves is that it is not reflectance that we perceived, but some extension of reflectance, some property that is coextensive with reflectance when restricted to reflecting surfaces. I shall not attempt to define this property here, but I believe that it would not be hard to define.
A second line of argument is emphasized by Mundle and McGilvray.23 These philosophers argue that, according to Land, our awareness of what we call "color" is the product not only of the stimulations incident upon the retina, but of our own "mental" activity. Thus, they assimilate color vision to something like the Kantian model of transcendental idealism, arguing that, though color vision is initiated by a signal from without, the end product represents the external world in a way that owes more to the operation of color vision than to the nature of properties that have real existence.
The position taken by these philosophers is, I think, essentially the same as supposing that "color" vision is actually a presentation of certain kinds of brightness gradient. The claim is that there is no way to identify the output of color vision except as the input stimulation processed in a certain way. They do not question that this output should be called "color": their point is that, whatever it is called, there is no reason to identify that output as representing an external property. I claim, of course, that this is wrong: the functional schema-and the historical explanations it implicitly invokes-provides us with just this reason.
IX. INTENTIONAL EXPLANATION
A strength of the functional schema is that it accounts well for the peculiarities of intentional explanation-the explanation of the causal interrelations of states by reference to the content assigned to them. The first point to make here is that the functional schema enables us to distinguish between states that should be assigned content from states that should not. In this respect, the causal theory is not helpful. Recall that, according to a causal theory, the content of a perceptual state is what normally causes states of that material type. There is nothing in this theory itself which prevents us from saying that, for example, a column of smoke is a perception of wind speed, since it has a feature-the angle it makes with the horizon-that is normally caused by a particular wind speed.24 Thus, a causal theory needs an adjunct that distinguishes content-bearing states from non-content-bearing states. This does not apply to the functional schemata, Q and P. These assign content only to states that have the function of registering the presence of some object or circumstance. Since the angles of smoke columns do not have functions, they are excluded from the purview of this schema.
The second point to make is that the functional schema helps us understand the parallel relationships employed in intentional explanation. In intentional explanation, the explanantia and explananda are states with content. The explanation presupposes that the explanantia states cause the explanandum state to come into being25; the explanatory weight, however, lies not on this causal relationship, but on the logical relationship that exists between the intentional objects of the states. For example, suppose we seek to explain X's belief that p in terms of his belief that q and his belief that if q then p. This explanation would be inadmissible if the explanantia beliefs had not caused the explanandum belief to come about. The force of the explanation, however, is not primarily due to this causal relationship, but is due to the logical relationship that holds between q, if q then p, and p. Once we are told the relationship of the content of X's belief to the content of his other beliefs, we understand why he believes that p. It is this obliqueness of accounting for states by reference to content which characterizes intentional explanation.
It is puzzling that it should be legitimate, in explaining why X came to believe that p, to appeal to the logical relations that p bears to the objects of X's other beliefs-on the face of it, this explanatory strategy involves a category mistake, a confusion between the propositions toward which beliefs are directed, and the beliefs themselves. For, if we are interested in the transition from beliefs already held to new beliefs, we ought to attend to the causal powers of beliefs. Why should these causal powers be determined by abstract semantic relations in the realm of propositions? To answer this question is essentially to show why intentional explanation is legitimate. And, if a particular scheme of intentional ascription makes it easy to answer the question, that increases its plausibility as well as the plausibility of the explanations it supports.
It is easy to see that the functional schema helps explain why states should be connected in this way. If the function of a state is to detect the truth of p, and of another state to detect the truth of if p then q, then, if the detection of q is of any advantage at all, we should expect that a connection might well develop between these states and the state that detects q. By contrast, a causal theory is of no help here at all. That a state is normally caused by the truth of p, and another one by the truth of if p then q, is no reason at all to expect that the two together would cause the state that is normally caused by q. This is a consideration which applies not just to perceptual states but to all states with content-it suggests that they should all be defined functionally.
Evolutionary epistemology has sometimes been regarded as providing us with reasons for disavowing skepticism. It is easy to see now that it cannot do this. For evolution may provide us with senses that are quite reliable, but there is no reason to believe that it provides us with senses that guarantee the truth of any particular perceptionthat is the lesson of "normal misperception." Nevertheless, evolutionary epistemology has an important role to play. We started this paper with a question from traditional epistemology-What constitutes the mode of presentation in perception? We found that computational theories of perception have something important to contribute to this question and that the theory of evolution is foundationally important to computational theories. To the extent that such theories tend to inform us about the structure of our perceptually derived concepts, then, evolution can after all do what Konrad Lorenz,26 the founder of evolutionary epistemology, hoped. It can show how that which is a priori for the individual is a posteriori for the species. That is, a study of evolution can help us lay the foundations of an understanding of innate ways of representing the external world. That is no small contribution. 
